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Slapping the Visible Hand
The SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation in Search of a Pur-
pose. By Homer Kripke. New York: Law & Business, Inc., 1979. Pp.
368. $49.50.
Leonard Chazent
In the 1960s, Professor Lipson described the Yale Law School fac-
ulty as a collection of Young Fogies and Old Turks. Among securi-
ties lawyers, a group not particularly noted for its iconoclasm, Homer
Kripke is without question the premier Old Turk. Beginning forty-
five years ago as an enthusiastic member of the staff at the Securities
and Exchange Commission, he soon grew disillusioned with the Com-
mission's regulat6ry philosophy and became one of its principal critics.
In The SEC and Corporate Disclosure," he tells why he thinks that
the SEC and the system of mandated disclosure it administers harm
the very investors they are supposed to protect.
Professor Kripke's views differ in breadth as well as in tone from
most of what is written about securities regulation. Detailed criticism
of the SEC ordinarily comes from industry groups and bar association
committees composed of practicing securities lawyers. Although those
lawyers may conscientiously leave their clients at the door when they
speak for the organized bar, their approach to securities regulation in-
evitably reflects their professional experience and orientation. As a
result, the SEC hears far more about the practical problems of com-
plying with its proposed rules than about the rules and the policies
that it should be, but is not, proposing.
Professor Kripke has never suffered from such a limited vision. He
has devoted enormous energy and polemical skill to working for basic
changes in the pattern of securities regulation. Two causes, in par-
ticular, are associated with his name: encouraging securities issuers
to make public disclosure of earnings projections and other forward-
jt Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York; Visiting Lecturer in
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looking information 2 and replacing a system of accounting based al-
most entirely on historical costs with one that reflects current costs
and values.3
For years, those positions placed Professor Kripke in opposition to
the SEC, which excluded earnings projections from prospectuses and
proxy statements and allowed the accounting profession to require
that financial statements be prepared on the basis of historical costs.
During the 1970s, events began going Professor Kripke's way. In
1977, the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure recommended
that the Commission permit issuers to include projections and other
"soft" information in their SEC disclosure documents, and a short
while later, the Commission in substance adopted the Committee pro-
posal.4 Meanwhile, in Accounting Series Release No. 190, the SEC
took a first step in the direction of current-value accounting by re-
quiring that companies registered with the Commission disclose the
cost of replacing productive capacity (for example, plant and equip-
ment) and inventory. Following the completion of Professor Kripke's
book, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the policy-
making body of the accounting profession, acknowledged the need
to account for inflation and required large public companies to try
various ways of reporting inflationary effects on income. 6
Although his ideas have now won broad acceptance, success has
not softened Homer Kripke. His years of combat with the SEC and
the FASB seem to have persuaded him that those institutions are
misguided and still have a pernicious influence on securities dis-
closure. Professor Kripke's present views, as reflected in The SEC
and Corporate Disclosure, rest on three fundamental ideas. First, it
is doubtful that any system of government-mandated disclosure to
investors is needed. Professor Kripke would abolish the detailed forms
by which the SEC requires companies to disclose information to the
investing public. Second, if the government is to prescribe disclo-
sures for a public company, different information should be disclosed.
including data that relate the company to the entire economy and
stock market. Third, the SEC as an institution needs a complete
reorientation, away from its recent preoccupations with presenting
2. See, e.g., Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1197-1201 (1970).
3. See id. at 1188-96.
4. See Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1979).
5. See Securities Act Release No. 5695, 41 Fed. Reg. 13,596 (1976).
6. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS No. 33 (1979).
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historical data and punishing corporate wrongdoers, and toward pro-
viding investors with information that will help them evaluate a
company's prospects.
The chapters of the book that question the need for government-
mandated disclosure had their origin in Professor Kripke's service on
the Commission's Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure. Pro-
fessor Kripke tried unsuccessfully to get the Committee to undertake
a serious reexamination of the need for government-mandated dis-
closure.7 When the report was completed, Professor Kripke prepared
a separate concurring opinion in which he "expressed some cost/benefit
hypotheses." In response, one of the Committee members prepared
a lengthy defense of the existing pattern of securities regulation, in
which detailed disclosure requirements prescribed by the government
supplement general antifraud rules and in which compliance is en-
couraged by a combination of industry self-regulation, government
enforcement, and private civil actions. This defense became the In-
troduction to the Advisory Committee report." Finding that the Com-
mittee report as revised expressly rebutted his views on mandated
disclosure, Professor Kripke changed his concurrence to a dissent and
promised that he would address the need for mandated disclosure in
detail at another time.
The SEC and Corporate Disclosure contains Professor Kripke's
promised statement of his views. A few months ago, a book that ques-
tioned the need for any mandated disclosure would have seemed to
have only academic interest. The SEC was a fixture, and opponents
could hope to do no more than to curtail its activities modestly. To-
day, with a Reagan Transition Team report having called for a forty
percent reduction in the SEC staff9 (to include a seventy-five percent
cut in the Division of Enforcement), SEC abolitionism seems less far-
fetched. Against this background, Professor Kripke's book is timely
and important. Because he is a brilliant and knowledgeable critic of
securities regulation, it is worth examining the theoretical structure
he provides for the case against mandated disclosure.
7. See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., IST SESS.,
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION at D-49 (Comm. Print 1977).
8. Id. at I-XLXIX.
9. The Transition Team concluded that a great deal of the current disclosure require-
ments are unnecessary for investor protection and described the Commission's attempts
to streamline disclosure as "a regulator's idea of deregulation." See Legal Times of 'Wash.,
Jan. 26, 1981, at 8, col. 2.
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Professor Kripke's basic point is that issuers have an adequate eco-
nomic incentive to publicize voluntarily any information whose value
to investors exceeds the cost of collection and dissemination. Should
investors not receive an adequate regular flow of information from
a public company, they would shun its securities, which would then
drop in price; the company, as well as its management and share-
holders, would suffer when trying to sell the securities in public mar-
kets. Professor Kripke is correct when he says that the incentive pro-
vided by the investors' demands may be sufficient for a company
that is doing well and that periodically sells securities to the public,
but what of a company that has an embarrassing problem or fears
that disclosure of important information will injure the company
commercially? Management may decide that the benefits of keeping
the information under wraps outweigh the harm that will be done to
the company's reputation with investors, particularly if the company
is not currently selling securities to the public and can exclude the
information without violating the antifraud rules. If some companies
elect not to provide the information that was needed by investors,
all public companies will suffer, because investors in public securities
will presumably discount the value of the securities they buy to re-
flect the risk that the issuer will someday elect to retreat into the
shadows.
Of course, the burden that compliance with mandated disclosure
places on public issuers may outweigh the benefits to investors. Pro-
fessor Kripke believes that the present system is very costly, in that
issuers are forced to generate voluminous materials that are of no
interest to investors and are restrained from providing investors with
useful evaluative material. His arguments on this point, however,
are merely impressionistic; so too are the claims of the Advisory Com-
mittee on the other side. There has not yet been a detailed study
of the costs and benefits of mandated disclosure. Indeed, Professor
Kripke's greatest disappointment with the Advisory Committee is
that it did not attempt such a study.
In evaluating government-mandated disclosure, it is tempting,
though wrong, to blame either the SEC's forms or its advance screen-
ing of disclosure documents for faults that are caused by the anti-
fraud rules and the civil-liability provisions, both of which Professor
Kripke would retain. Like other critics of federal securities regula-
tion, Professor Kripke complains of the undue length and indis-
criminately negative tone of Securities Act prospectuses. Whatever
the historical role of the Commission in encouraging the develop-
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ment of these traits, they would survive, I think, even without an
SEC mandate because they provide useful protection against civil
liability.
On questions of whether particular information is material to in-
vestors, securities lawyers typically err on the side of overdisclosure
rather than run the risk that a judge with perfect hindsight will
later find an omission material. Securities Act prospectuses would be
prolix documents even if the SEC were to disappear tomorrow. The
negativism of SEC disclosure documents can also be credited to pro-
tective lawyering; that too would continue without the SEC. A
lawyer whose client is issuing securities to the public is understand-
ably more comfortable with a warning about the bad that can happen
than with an attempt to evaluate the prospects for good and bad.
Although sophisticated securities lawyers try to avoid a standard
parade of horribles and recognize that boilerplate disclosure is usually
too general to indicate to investors the specific problems that merit
their concern, the overall influence of securities lawyers has been to
shift disclosure documents to the dark end of the spectrum. For ex-
ample, the safe harbor for projections and other forward-looking
statements, adopted after years of campaigning by Professor Kripke
and others, may encourage the inclusion of judgmental material in
some circumstances. Yet even when the safe harbor is available, law-
yers are likely to worry that the prospective statements will be found
misleading for failure to make adequate disclosure of the underlying
assumptions. Except for projections that are essential to a successful
sale of a security issue, lawyers are likely to counsel their clients
against taking the risks of gratuitous evaluation.
These conclusions do not mean that I would go beyond Professor
Kripke and recommend the abolition of the antifraud rules and the
civil liability provisions along with the disclosure forms. Perhaps
the greatest contribution of the present system of securities regu-
lation .is the process by which accountants and lawyers, motivated
in large part by the civil liability provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws, seek to ferret out problems that should be disclosed in the
prospectus. Professor Kripke does not give due credit to the dis-
closure system's achievements in this area. When he observes that
the leading financial debacles of recent times-Equity Funding, Penn
Central, and Sterling Homex-involved companies registered with
the SEC, he might also mention that the problems of the Penn
Central Company, by far the largest of these corporations, were brought
to light by a lawyer performing due diligence for a lead underwriter.
936
Vol. 90: 932, 1981
SEC Disclosure
No one can say how many of the troubled companies of recent times
would have gone quietly along signaling "business as usual" if dis-
closure professionals had not been on the scene.
Having paid this tribute to my own profession, I must acknowl-
edge that there is a cost of having liability-oriented disclosure docu-
ments, a cost that goes beyond the fees that are paid to lawyers for
drafting those documents and defending them in court. As long as
the primary concern of those who prepare disclosure documents is
defense against potential litigation, those documents will be discur-
sive and indiscriminately negative in tone. Therefore, the main ques-
tion about many SEC rule proposals is not whether the role of the
staff should be expanded or contracted, but whether the fear of civil
liability should be used to encourage greater involvement by outside
lawyers and other liability-minded disclosure professionals. For ex-
ample, the adoption of registration forms that allow incorporation
by reference of various filings under the Securities Exchange Act,
including a company's report on Form 10-K, has constricted the in-
vestigations performed by underwriters and their lawyers, who have
little chance to help prepare the description of the company and its
business. Should the standards by which courts judge the adequacy
of the underwriters' investigation reflect their limited opportunities
for review? Or should the threat of civil liability be used to spur un-
derwriters to develop intensive investigation procedures and supple-
mental disclosures for short-form registration? Assuming that the ap-
propriate occasion for due diligence is the preparation of Form 10-K
rather than of the registration statement, is the SEC correct to en-
courage the anxieties of public-company directors by requiring them
to sign the 10-K? Having heard Professor Kripke speak eloquently
on these issues in private sessions, I was disappointed to find that he
paid little attention to them in his book.
Assuming that the SEC will continue to administer a mandatory
disclosure system, the most promising path to reform may be the one
suggested by the Advisory Committee: the development, based on
information from industry analysts and other users of the informa-
tion, of more disclosure forms for specific industries. Professor Kripke
criticizes the Commission for adopting industry-segment reporting re-
quirements in response to pressure from securities analysts, but he
does not adequately consider whether the value of the information
merits the cost to issuers of providing it. If we acknowledge a need
for attention to information costs, the segment-reporting episode il-
lustrates the role that the SEC can properly play in the disclosure
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system: whenever the Commission believes that the information is
not excessively costly to provide and need not be kept secret for
commercial reasons, it can assist sophisticated investors in getting
information that issuers are not providing voluntarily. Ideally, the
SEC would only rarely require disclosure of information that issuers
uniformly withhold from the public: that public companies in gen-
eral do not find a sufficient incentive to furnish a particular class of
information to investors should be taken to establish a prima facie
case that the costs of disclosure outweigh the benefits. In addition to
playing this informational role as a kind of enlightened Federal Trade
Commission for securities analysts, the SEC could still perform the
other tasks it has undertaken in the past. For example, it could use
securities disclosure to highlight ethical issues, such as improper pay-
ment and management "perks," and it could alert public investors
to special risks needing their attention. Those tasks, however, are
distinct from the task of providing information useful to sophisticated
investors, and I personally find Professor Kripke persuasive when
he argues against those uses of the disclosure process.
Some of Professor Kripke's ideas about disclosure are based on his
readings in the modern economic theory of securities markets. In
particular, he relies on the efficient market theory, which maintains
that the market price of a security reflects all publicly available in-
formation about the issuer, and on model portfolio theory, which
holds that the risk of a security relative to the market as a whole-
measured by the beta coefficient-can be eliminated by a properly di-
versified portfolio. Professor Kripke is impressed by the importance
of risk analysis in portfolio selection. To help investors evaluate the
riskiness of the securities they buy, he would have the SEC require
that public issuers either disclose their beta coefficients or give in-
formation from which those numbers could be deduced. It might
suffice to disclose, for example, a comparison of the security's past
market history with the performance of a broad-based market index,
or a comparison of the company's earnings history with general mar-
ket fluctuations in earnings. All this information, however, seems to
be of a kind that, at present, is publicly available or can be assembled
from public sources. Even conceding that the information is valuable,
therefore, it is puzzlingly inconsistent with his general attitude to-
wards government-mandated disclosure that Professor Kripke would
involve the SEC in its dissemination. The most persuasive arguments
for. government-mandated disclosure by public issuers rest on the
fact that information of certain kinds cannot be obtained from sources
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other than the issuer, even by investors that are willing to pay for
it. There seems to be no good reason, on the other hand, not to al-
low information that can be put together from public sources to
prove its worth in the marketplace. If a compilation of the beta co-
efficients of particular securities is genuinely worthwhile to inves-
tors, some investment research firm should find it profitable to com-
pute and to distribute the information.
II
Another theme that pervades The SEC and Corporate Disclosure
is that the Commission is a frightening institution. Most of Professor
Kripke's criticisms of the Commission have been heard before, but
rarely with such vehemence and in such concentrated form. As seen
by Professor Kripke, the SEC staff is arrogant, ignorant, and self-
righteous. 10 It misunderstands the investment process (for example,
it overemphasizes historical, company-oriented information),"1 wages
crusades against business practices that are outside its proper field
of concern (for example, it attacks improper payments and manage-
ment "perks"), 12 ties the hands of the securities industry and public
issuers with far-fetched interpretations of its rules (for example, it
applies Rule lOb-6 to "distributions" of securities through employee
stock options, and it applies SEC rules excessively to foreign com-
panies),"8 and generally comports itself with a self-righteous air that
maddens Professor Kripke. These polemical assaults sometimes seem
unfair to the Commission. For example, the discussion of the 140
series of rules, prescribing exemptions from the registration require-
ments of the Securities Act, falsely gives the impression that the 140
series has significantly complicated the task of selling securities with.
out registration. In fact, Rule 144, which deals with sales by affil-
iates and by people that buy securities in private placements, has
certainly made it easier to sell without registration, and the other rules
in the 140 series have not, in my opinion, significantly added to the
burden of securities regulation. Ten or even five years ago, an un-
balanced attack on the Commission might have been a useful coun-
10. See H. KIupxE, supra note 1, at 37-60 (describing ways in which "Overrating the
Importance of Its Contribution to the Securities Market Makes the SEC Overly Zealous').
11. See id. at 24-31.
12. See id. at 42.
13. See id. at 53-56, 59-60. The Commission has proposed an amendment to Rule lOb-6
that would exempt distributions pursuant to stock-option plans. See Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 16,646, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,948 (1980).
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terweight to the uncritical praise it generally received. Recently, how-
ever, the SEC staff has met significant obstacles, even if the events
of 1981 are ignored. The Supreme Court has turned against the
Commission,' 4 the Commissioners have become more independent,"
and there is an antiregulatory mood in Congress that could eviscerate
the SEC, as it has the FTC. With these changes, the Commission
has developed a responsiveness to the opinions of others very different
in spirit from the agency portrayed by Professor Kripke. As a result,
reading Professor Kripke's book, which was written just as the tide
was beginning to turn, is like watching someone fire at a wounded
soldier.
III
The SEC and Corporate Disclosure includes a lengthy historical
critique of the Commission's views on accounting theory. I imagine
that many business lawyers share my hazy understanding of the issues
of principle that divide the accounting profession. Professor Kripke's
book provides an interesting, if somewhat theoretical, introduction
to these matters. Along the way, it tells the fascinating story of Judge
Robert E. Healy, a Vermont lawyer who, while investigating the
collapse of the public utility holding systems, became convinced that
writing-up assets was the equivalent of "original sin."'16 He carried
this conviction to the SEC, where, as a Commissioner, he established
the original-cost dogma that was with us through the 1970s.
The SEC's complicity with the accounting profession in preserving
original-cost accounting might seem at first to. be one of its most serious
historical failings. Recently there has been much published criticism
of the top management of our large corporations for allowing America's
industrial productivity to lag.' 7 With the Japanese managers seen as
the model of correct behavior, American managers have been criti-
cized for neglecting the modernization of our industrial plants in
order to pursue short-term profits. Original-cost accounting might
seem to encourage this behavior because it increases depreciation
charges against reported earnings for firms that purchase new plant
14. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (SEC required to establish scienter in
order to enjoin violation of § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act).
15. For example, in In re Carter & Johnson, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
17,597 (Feb. 28, 1981), [1981] 593 SEc. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) N-I, the Commission dis-
missed a highly publicized staff proceeding against two securities lawyers, though it adopted
some of the legal theories that the staff had put forth in the case.
16. See H. KauPaa, supra note 1, at 179-84.
17. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1981, § D, at 2, col. 1 (interview with Reginald Jones).
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and equipment. From evidence cited by Professor Kripke,18 how-
ever, it appears that financial analysts recognize that income reported
by companies with old plant and equipment is in effect inflated, and
that analysts make the adjustments they consider appropriate for
valuing the securities of such companies. Therefore, if management
desires to support the price of its company's stock, it does not have
an incentive to defer modernization. Whatever a company gains in
additional reported earnings, it loses in the form of a quality-of-in-
come discount.1 9
These questions regarding the importance of the accounting prac-
tices of public issuers return us to a point made earlier, in the dis-
cussion of disclosures about a company's beta coefficient. The uni-
fying theme of Professor Kripke's views on disclosure is his commit-
ment to encouraging issuers to reveal "soft" information. Few would
question the importance to investors of management's judgments about
matters, such as earnings projections, on which it has a unique van-
tage point. Its views on other questions relating to the company, in-
cluding macroeconomic issues, the general prospects for the company's
industry, and possibly even the cost of replacing the company's pro-
ductive capacity, are of less compelling interest because investors can
get an equally expert and perhaps less biased judgment elsewhere.
Therefore, unless one believes that Securities Act prospectuses should
contain all the information needed for an investment decision about
the issuer's securities-a naive position that Professor Kripke certain-
ly does not take-it is unnecessary to wage the battle for soft infor-
mation on all fronts, and advocates like Professor Kripke should
probably reserve their enthusiasm for items on which the issuer's views
are irreplaceable.
18. H. KmpiaE, supra note 1, at 161-68.
19. In a recent interview with The New York Times, a leading business executive
suggested that management is reluctant to take measures that might reduce reported
earnings "because most top executive contracts are tied to reported earnings." N.Y.
Times, Jan. 27, 1981, § D, at 2, col. 2 (interview with Reginald Jones). If an executive
is concerned with his compensation under a contract of this type, rather than with
the market price of a company's shares, original-cost accounting would probably give
the executive a disincentive to have his company make new investments in plant and
equipment. Moreover, even the steps toward inflation accounting recently taken by the
FASB would not seem to solve the problem because they give inflation-adjusted earnings
as supplementary information while allowing reported earnings to be calculated on an
original-cost basis.
The Federalist as Myth
Explaining America: The Federalist. By Garry Wills. New York:
Doubleday & Company, 1981. Pp. xxii, 286. $14.95.
Judith N. Shklart
Political myths are neither true nor false. They are generally ve-
hicles of self-expression and self-orientation. If they correspond to the
requirements of a group, they may be told, retold, and embroidered
by one generation after another.
Among all the varieties of political myths, none have a longer his-
tory or a greater popularity than those that deal with the creation of
states. The classic form of the political creation myth recounts the
activities of founders of cities. The lives and works of these supermen
serve at once as models of aspiration, as justifications for traditions
and rules, and as legitimations of the structure of power. For those
brought up on the classics, that is, the entire educated class of Euro-
peans and Americans until the present century, the supreme and most
familiar telling of political creation myths was Plutarch's Lives. From
the pages of Plutarch, the great legislator has risen to haunt our
political imagination. The legislator-superman has served as a useful
ideal both for radicals intent on indicting existing regimes, and for
authoritarians in awe of the past. All things considered, however, the
influence of Plutarch's founders has been for the worse: the myth
of Lycurgus' creation of Sparta has had a thoroughly mischievous
effect on our thinking; the accounts of Solon and Publius certainly
have done nothing for our common sense.
It was unfortunate, therefore, that Madison and Hamilton chose
to write under the single pseudonym of Publius. To take on such a
name was very much consistent with the fashions of the day, of course,
and the selection underscored the importance that the two authors
attached to The Federalist.1 But the choice of Publius also was very
t John Cowles Professor of Government, Harvard University.
1. THE FEDERALIST (J. Cooke ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited to this edition without ref-
erence to editor]. John Jay wrote five papers in The Federalist. Wills discusses Jay briefly,
but correctly concentrates on Madison and Hamilton.
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misleading. Madison and Hamilton, after all, took great pains to dem-
onstrate to their countrymen that the proposed Constitution had not
been drawn up by a single, supreme individual, but instead was the
product of collaboration.2 Indeed, they explained, the constitutional
plan was superior to the work of any ancient prodigy precisely be-
cause it had been framed by many reasonable citizens acting together.
Their work, moreover, drew heavily upon the latest and the best in
political science, which meant, again, that no single mind prevailed.
Nothing was more in keeping with the scientific spirit of the age
than to view political reasoning and institution building as collabo-
rative public planning. In fact, the only resemblance this explicitly
modern act of legislation had to its ancient mythical namesake was
the recognition that lawmaking was a deliberate and conscious ac-
tivity and that drift and fatality were to be avoided at all costs.
Unhappily, Publius' decidedly self-confident stress on the merits of
political collaboration was in vain. In essence, his name has triumphed
over his overt intentions. Publius has become the chief subject-per-
haps the chief victim-of a silly creation myth at odds with both his
message and his spirit.
The myth of "The American Founding" is nothing if not personal
and heroic. The Constitution may have been written by the men
assembled in the Convention, goes the argument, but its true mean-
ing can be found only in The Federalist. Publius thus becomes our
great national legislator, our Lycurgus and our Solon. He is the
Founding Father; to understand his every thought is essential in order
to know what is "acceptable" in constitutional law, national ideology,
political practice, and public values generally. Publius defines, once
and for all, what America is and what it ought to be. He explains,
directs, and expresses all that we are and can become. The Federalist
is, so to speak, our political essence. The sacred writ is to be glossed
and its authors deified.
What renders such an exercise in historical superstition credible,
of course, is that "the intent of the Framers" is often an important
starting point in constitutional adjudication. Such reference to and
reverence for tradition no doubt contributes to the continuity and
acceptability of judicial decisions. Perhaps it is understandable, then,
that a certain kind of conservative in search of authority, remember-
ing what ancestor worship did for the Romans, should appeal to "the
Fathers" and ignore all subsequent generations. For that matter, cre-
ation myths can serve-indeed, have usually served-the purpose of
2. See, e.g., id. No. 2 (J. Jay); Nos. 37, 38 (J. Madison); No. 85 (A. Hamilton).
The Yale Law Journal
the disaffected. After all, retrospective utopias are by no means lack-
ing in revolutionary charm.
In writing history and political analysis, however, an atavistic im-
pulse is useless for explaining or for judging the character of con-
temporary constitutional and political institutions. For a historian or
a political scientist, a creation myth can be of little value. To be sure,
the original understanding of the Constitution may have had a more
profound and enduring impact upon its subsequent development than
any other single theory. But the notion of "explaining" America by
looking only at The Federalist is an historical absurdity, considering
all that has happened since Publius wrote. To dwell only on the
character and vision of Madison and Hamilton, admirable as those
men were, makes even less sense. Nevertheless, that is exactly what
Garry Wills has done in Explaining America.3
II
It would be bad enough if Explaining America were simply another
contribution to the mythological literature on our national creation.
Unfortunately, the book is not even a very good retelling of the myth.
Wills' discussion often is so confused that it is impossible to discern
the subject matter of a given chapter. Moreover, because as he warns
us early on, "ask not for context,"4 we need not expect anything in
the way of historical narrative. What we get are potted biographies
of Madison and Hamilton, but only up to the moment of their writing
The Federalist; an elaborate effort to show the influence of David
Hume on both men; and finally, an attempt to deal with their theories
of checks and balances and representation.5 At the end, Wills admits
that, contrary to his title, he has not really explained all of America,
but only its worthiest part: the memory of Publius.6
Oddly enough, considering this performance as a whole, Wills is
quite aware of a number of the real issues at hand. Although he
generalizes rather wildly about the Enlightenment, he recognizes that
the era made for men who would have disliked this kind of homage
even though they longed for fame. He also realizes the importance
3. G. WiLLs, EXPLAINING AMEmCA: THE FEDErALIST (1981) [hereinafter cited by page
number only].
4. P. 11.
5. Wills' tone is moderate when discussing authors with whom he disagrees, but ef-
fusive and cloying when writing about those whom he admires-especially the late Douglass
Adair, who some years ago drew our attention to David Hume's probable influence on
Federalist 10, see p. 947 infra.
6. See pp. 265-70.
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for Publius of the political supremacy of opinion, the promise of
political science, and the possibility of constructing a wholly new form
of government. Because Wills does not trace the institutional impli-
cations either of these ideas or of Publius' own careful analyses of
political structures, however, all of this floats in a vacuum.
More important, Wills' insights pale in comparison with his omis-
sions. Explaining America covers federalism in six and a half pages;
the term is elaborately defined, but there is no discussion.7 Yet this
was the most important political issue of the day. Wills' treatment of
sovereignty is equally incomplete.8 And save for Robert Yates, he
never mentions the opponents against whom Publius was defending
the Philadelphia proposal. One would never know from Wills that The
Federalist was designed to calm the fears of local politicians as well
as to offer a new and grander project of government. In addition, Wills
seems only vaguely aware of the primacy of foreign affairs for Ham-
ilton and fails to explain Hamilton's emphasis on military strength
and his vision of a continental empire. Finally, Wills has hardly
scanned the pages of Gordon Wood's definitive political history of
the years preceding the Convention. 9 From Wood, Wills could have
learned why Madison viewed a new central government based on
"the people" as the only cure for the threatening anarchy that resulted
from radical, debt-forgiving, disorderly state legislatures. A book about
The Federalist that does not recognize the absolute centrality of the
tension between local and national politicians is simply unreal.
III
Explaining America begins with accounts of the intellectual devel-
opment of Madison and Hamilton prior to their writing of The
Federalist. Wills contends that both men have been utterly misunder-
stood by all previous biographers and historians: Madison in fact
was an aristocratic centralist; Hamilton was really a republican popu-
list.1° The first contention is unexceptional if it is meant to refer
only to Madison's view during the 1780s when he was thoroughly
disturbed by Shay's Rebellion and similar incidents. The second con-
tention is entirely unpersuasive in light of Hamilton's career. Wills'
way of "explaining" the two authors, however, is certainly not political.
Wills' biographical method leaves much to be desired. He focuses
7. Pp. 169-75.
8. See pp. 949-50 infra.
9. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLC, 1776-1787 (1969).
10. See pp. 3-93.
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almost exclusively on what young Hamilton and Madison read in
college and by whom they were taught-presumably on the assump-
tion that one's intellectual outlook is forever shaped in late ado-
lescence. Perhaps Wills genuinely holds such primitive ideas about
historical causality. Perhaps he genuinely believes that certain intel-
lectual influences, such as the books that an individual reads, act
as the formal and effective causes of his later conduct. Concentration
on youthful training, moreover, is usual in heroic myths. All this
aside, however, what is particularly inadequate about Wills' proce-
dure is his total silence about everything Madison and Hamilton
said and did after The Federalist. The possibility that their later
writings and speeches might tell us something about their earlier
selves or their characters as a whole seems never to have occurred to
Wills.
We hear nothing in Explaining America, for example, about Madi-
son's relationship to Jefferson, except for a discussion of the one oc-
casion in The Federalist when Madison disagreed with the latter's
proposal. 1 If one reads only Wills, one would find it impossible to
guess that-much less to understand why-Madison introduced and
promoted the first ten amendments. It would be just as difficult to
guess that Madison was constantly aware of the terrible tensions be-
tween the Northern and Southern states, and that this affected his
thinking about parties. And no reader of this book would know of
Madison's part in advancing the "federal ratio" and what that entailed
for the place of slavery in the Constitution and in our history.' 2
The portrait of Hamilton is equally incomplete. We are given a
genuine sense of his modernity and are made to understand the im-
portance of his military experience. But Hamilton's political opinions
are grotesquely misrepresented. To be sure, Wills correctly absolves
Hamilton of hypocrisy: he defended the Constitution with perfect
candor because he knew that it was better than nothing. But if Wills
had consulted Hamilton's later correspondence, he would have learned
that the coauthor of The Federalist despised the Constitution as a
feeble and faulty instrument. 3 Wills would have known, as all Ham-
ilton's opponents knew, that good administration is not the same
thing as republican equality and that Hamilton thought the people
deserved the former but were not entitled to the latter. Wills could
11. See pp. 24-45 (discussing Federalist No. 49).
12. See generally M. MEYERS, THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON (1973).
13. See J. MILRp, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: PORTRAIT IN PARADOX 543 (1959).
946
Vol. 90: 942, 1981
The Federalist
only have concluded that Hamilton was not "really" a republican
populist.
Perhaps Wills' most bizarre misreading of Hamilton involves Fed-
eralist 78. Wills' argument is that, far from implying judicial su-
premacy, in defending judicial review Hamilton really was arguing
for the sovereignty of the legislature. 14 That Hamilton denied the
obvious implications of judicial review is true enough. Men like Rob-
ert Yates had already warned the New York ratifying convention that
the proposed federal judiciary would be free to decide exactly what
the vaguely worded Constitution meant, that the federal courts would
dominate over those of the states, and that there was no practicable
restraint upon this new power. 15 Hamilton tried to soothe these
prophetic anxieties by insisting on the absence of will and power in
the judiciary; he contended, quite implausibly, that the range of fed-
eral discretion would not be greater than in ordinary cases involving
conflicts of law. Thus, the judiciary would be in no position to legis-
late. It could hardly act as an additional expression of the popular
will.16 Had Wills looked at Hamilton's later comments on the Mar-
shall Court, however, he might have understood Federalist 78 differ-
ently. In Hamilton's view, the Chief Justice was far too moderate in
the application of judicial power against the Jeffersonian ascendancy.17
Judicial supremacy as a bulwark against democratic legislatures and
localism was exactly what Yates feared and what Hamilton had in
mind when he wrote Federalist 78.
Wills' second aim in Explaining America is to demonstrate the
decisive influence of David Hume on Publius. Douglass Adair cor-
rectly observed that Federalist 10 bore Hume's imprint.'8 According
to Wills, however, not only Federalist 10, but the entire mindset of
our heroes can be explained by the Scot's influence. Characteristically,
Wills provides no clear account of Hume's philosophy as a whole.' 9
But whenever there is to be found in Publius a shared phrase or a
common thought, we are meant to see deep ties to Scottish philoso-
14. See pp. 130-50. Wills writes of Federalist 78: "Over and over in this paper Hamil-
ton is stressing one thing-legislative supremacy, the supremacy of the more democratic
ratifying conventions over indirect representation by majority vote in the Congress."
P. 134.
15. See Yates, The Letters of "Brutus", in C. KENYON, THE ANTIFEDERALISrS 334-57
(1966).
16. See TAE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
17. See P. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUB-
Lac 57-68 (1971).
18. See D. ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 75-106 (1974).
19. Wills begins each chapter in Explaining America with a short quotation from
Hume. In most instances, however, the relevance of the selection is extremely obscure.
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phers in general and to Hume in particular. Hamilton liked cities,
and so did they. What could prove influence more conclusively? Hume
had no use for the Country party with its cant about ancient virtue
and its grumbling about corruption and decay. Publius also was a
generation removed from the Country-style ideology of New England's
pre-Revolutionary Old Whigs. Again, influence is manifest.
This is not to say, of course, that Wills errs in finding traces of
Hume within The Federalist. It is to say, however, that too often
Wills infers too much from those traces. For example, Hume's his-
torical utilitarianism, in which antiquity is proof of an institution's
worth, his dislike of violence, and his overall caution are not unlike
Madison's general outlook. Nevertheless, religious toleration was
Madison's first and deepest political commitment, and such toleration
did not spring from a Humean agnosticism. Moreover, Madison did
not shirk novelty of the most extreme sort. The Constitution itself
exemplified exactly the type of enormous innovation feared by Hume.
The novelty of the Convention scared not only radicals from Penn-
sylvania, but also traditionalists from Massachusetts who wanted to
preserve their particular culture. All were suspicious of Publius' un-
Humean rashness. Finally, while Wills notices that Hamilton did not
share Hume's objections to a funded national debt,20 he obviously
has no idea of how important that issue was in eighteenth-century
Anglo-American politics. "Ask not for context," to be surel
In addition to Hume, the Enlightenment also is made to do heavy-
duty work in Explaining America. For Wills, the Enlightenment means
a new vocabulary and scientific optimism. To illustrate the vocabulary
we get not only a glossary, but also a chapter of vaguely medical defi-
nitions drawn from eighteenth-century dictionaries to explain Publius'
metaphors.21 The purpose of this exercise, however, is far from clear.
With respect to scientific optimism, Wills' failure to be precise leads
him to overstate his case. Publius contended that political science had
advanced far enough for him and his contemporaries to engage in
successful institutional engineering.2 2 That assertion, however, was
a considerable distance from the optimism of Jefferson and Rush.
Publius did not admit to any great confidence in moral progress or
any belief in the intelligence of most men. He looked to safeguards
against mankind's "limited generosity," to use Hume's phrase-one
that Wills misses. Such a view set him apart from his more egalitarian
20. See pp. 69.71.
21. See pp. 238-47, 280-82.
22. See THE FER AsT No. 9 (A. Hamilton).
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opponents who preferred frequent elections, small constituencies,
popular participation, and as little government as possible.
At the same time, though, Publius was not unduly grim about his
fellow citizens: his certainly was more of an up-beat spirit than that
of the older John Adams or those of the New Englanders who could
see only despotism in a Constitution that bound both themselves and
dissipated Southern slave owners into a single political unit. In short,
Publius was safely in the middle; this contributed to his triumph. An
analysis not of the Enlightenment, but of Publius' place in the spec-
trum of American opinion, would help explain the position and the
success of The Federalist. Such detailed and potentially rewarding
historical analysis, however, does not interest Wills, who either deals
in the broadest of generalities or gets lost in the minutiae of speech.
IV
When Wills directly confronts the genuine subject matter of The
Federalist, he usually gets it wrong or talks around it. That such a
conclusion is not unjustly harsh can be shown by considering his
extended discussions of sovereignty and representation, the impor-
tance of which he rightly recognizes.
Wills is quite right in noting that Publius thought sovereignty,
separated from its monarchical and absolutist origins, could none-
theless survive federalism and republican government. 23 Wills never
asks, however, just what the sovereignty of "the people" could mean.
He never discovers just how remote the concept of popular sovereignty
advanced in The Federalist was from the monarchical ideology that
led to the belief that an imperium in imperio was an absurdity. For
Hamilton, sovereignty had more to do with a unified and reliable
United States playing an independent role in the international society
of states.24 Here no great conceptual alteration was required by re-
publican institutions, though an "energetic" executive was part of
Hamilton's orientation.
From a domestic perspective, however, the sovereignty of "the peo-
ple" implies nothing more than the primacy of recognized procedures
in lawmaking, even in the sovereign act of amendment. Public law
and policy are made through the process of politics rather than by
a final deciding will. With respect to individual cases, of course, ju-
dicial reasoning may require an end point in the hierarchy of deci-
23. See pp. 162-68.
24. See TnE FEDERAZxs Nos. 11, 15 (A. Hamilton).
949
The Yale Law Journal
sions. With respect to republican lawmaking and remaking in general,
there is no need for such an ultimate judgment. In America, sover-
eignty was replaced by politics as a continuous, legally directed pro-
cess; indeed Madison recognized as much in his later years.25 And
precisely because it was replaced by politics, the end of sovereignty
proved no great loss to American public law or to political theory.
The will of the people is an appeal to legitimacy, not sovereignty.
Unhappily, Wills understands none of this. He never examines why
some have suggested, 20 along the above lines, that Madison dispensed
altogether with the idea of sovereignty as a necessary item of political
thinking. Wills simply asserts, unpersuasively, that The Federalist re-
mained true to time-worn notions of sovereignty.27 About popular
sovereignty, however, he says nothing at all.
Representation is the most important of all topics discussed in The
Federalist. Wills knows this, but again fails to make sense of what is
being said and why it mattered. What bothers Wills is that Publius
still cared about public virtue, that he wanted men of probity to be
elected. Unlike modern pluralists, as Wills notes, 28 Madison was not
interested in diversity itself, but in how to arrange the interaction of
conflicting groups in such a way that they would not violate "the
public good." For Publius still believed in the discernible existence
of "a public weal" and in its difference from private preferences.
2 9
As Hume's disciple, however, Publius should not have bothered with
public virtue at all. Clearly such residual classicism bothers Wills
immensely.
Actually, Publius' distance from Hume in this regard is not par-
ticularly great. Hume had great respect for impartiality and thought
it a great social virtue. In a society in which, as men had known since
the seventeenth century, "opinion is the queen of the world," impar-
tial, aloof, self-distancing judgment becomes particularly important
for statesmen. It is, in fact, the core of public virtue.
Without a belief in detached and impartial decisionmaking, neither
the separation of the judiciary from the legislature nor Madison's ad-
vocacy of representative government would make sense. The public
good is what all impartial men, devoted to their country, recognize
as the best course. It is neither certain nor static. There is room for
25. See Madison, Notes on Nullification, in M. MEYERS, supra note 12, at 568-74.
26. See, e.g., M. MEYERS, supra note 12, at 91.
27. Pp. 167-68.
28. See pp. 201-07.
29. See, e.g., THE FEDEELtusT No. 10 (J. Madison).
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argument, but it is an attainable end and it entails a self-restraining
code of public conduct. To Madison, representative government
seemed particularly conducive to such an end.
For Madison, representative government was not just a necessary
substitute for direct democracy, given that the latter was impossible
in an "extended" republic.30 It was an inherently superior arrange-
ment. Representatives chosen for a two-year term from large districts
would come from a pool of the ablest people, and would have enough
time to gain the necessary political experience.31 To a democratic
anti-federalist, however, it was equally clear that this scheme played
into the hands of the rich and the clever who would best be able to
organize a large constituency, and who would forget all about their
electors in the long two years away from home. The anti-federalists
preferred a House of Representatives that was closer to, or more like,
the people.3
2
Madison, on the other hand, wanted the best men to emerge from
the electoral process. And the best men were likely to be educated
and rich. In Madison's view, these few were more likely to be im-
partial, more able to rise above the medley of opinions. Wills is a
bit upset by Madison's aristocratic stance, but he recognizes its confi-
dence in at least the possibility of public probity. Madison's intentions
were fully understood by his anti-federalist critics. Wills might be less
surprised about The Federalist had he read their comments.
There is, in fact, a second theory of representation in The Fed-
eralist, a theory that shows why Hamilton's reputation as a less-than-
ardent democrat is so fully deserved. Wills appears not to have under-
stood Federalist 35 even though he occasionally quotes from it. Had
he taken more trouble to analyze this paper, he might have gained
a deeper understanding both of the quarrel between Publius and the
anti-federalists and of the central issues of the period. Like Madison,
Hamilton looked not to unaided public virtue but to the electoral
process for superior representatives. But while Madison hoped for a
House of Representatives that was an improved, but still genuine,
portrait of the electorate, Hamilton rejected as "visionary" the idea
that every class should be represented. Observing the behavior of
voters in large states such as his own New York, he noted with relief
that members of the lower orders did not identify with their own
kind, but instead tended to support the most successful individuals
30. See id. No. 10 (J. Madison).
31. See id. Nos. 52-58 (J. Madison).
32. See Shklar, Publius and the Science of the Past, 86 YALE L.J. 1286, 1288-89 (1977).
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in the economic or professional group to which they belonged. A
shoemender would vote for a successful large-scale bootmaker rather
than for a potter who might be his social equal. 38 Hamilton's theory
of representation was premised on a belief that people at the bottom
trusted and would therefore elect those who, because of their industry
and capacity, had risen to the upper reaches of their particular in-
terest group.
According to Hamilton, there were three such interest groups in
society: the agricultural, the manufacturing, and the commercial.
Hamilton expected that, in order to reconcile these potentially in-
compatible groups, voters would also send members of the learned
professions to the House. These men of character and talent-lawyers,
presumably-would mediate among the landowners, the manufacturers,
and the merchants. In addition, they would act as experts. It was im-
possible, for example, to write tax laws without a thorough knowl-
edge of political economy.3 4 It was essential, therefore, that the less
instructed elect learned men to perform this and other tasks. Such
men, in short, would represent the brains of America.
Federalist 35 demonstrates that Hamilton simply was not a demo-
crat. His idea of the needs of the public reflected both his admiration
for the wealthy and, more significantly, his enthusiasm for the new
social sciences. Expertise, however, is not widely diffused through
society, nor is it the same thing as Madison's disinterested public
spirit. In the deferential order Hamilton envisioned, popular elections
would yield a ruling class in which clever, modem economists and
lawyers like himself would play a significant part. Although his scheme
did not reject popular elections, it did resemble older, discarded no-
tions about a virtual representation of stable interests.3 5 Federalist 35
explains how Hamilton acquired his reputation and why he and Jef-
ferson later came to stand for two parties of such differing principles.
It may be well also to recall that it was Madison who organized the
election for Jefferson. The Madison of Publius is not that later man,
but he was no Hamilton at any time.
Many Americans reading Hamilton may well have wondered what
the Revolution had been about if their relationship to their represen-
tatives was to be as remote as Hamilton hoped. To be sure, Madison's
papers on the House of Representatives might have reassured them
somewhat in this regard. But other aspects of the proposed Constitu-
33. THE FFDERALisT No. 35 (A. Hamilton).
34. Id.
35. Even Edmund Burke, the most vigorous defender of virtual representation, ad-
mitted that it must ultimately be grounded in the actual.
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tion were troubling to Americans of a more democratic persuasion
than Publius: a separation of powers designed to curb the legisla-
ture; 38 a Senate overtly called an upper house; 37 a powerful and "en-
ergetic" executive.38 These were the concerns of the men against whom
Publius wrote, whose opinions he wanted to challenge, and whom
he tried to convert.
If Wills had placed Publius within this whole structure of contro-
versy and had spent less time on remote influences, he might have
presented us with a believable portrait of two remarkable men. Their
characters, however virtuous, do not "explain America," of course,
but Wills at least might have shed some light on their intentions.
Unfortunately, Wills attempts none of this. His book strains for origi-
nality, but is inconclusive and incoherent. Even those who treasure
and believe in our national creation myth will not be satisfied.
36. See THE FDRArassT Nos. 47, 48, 51 (J. Madison).
37. See id. Nos. 62, 63 (J. Madison); No. 64 (J. Jay); Nos. 65, 66 (A. Hamilton).
38. See id. Nos. 66-77 (A. Hamilton).
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